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MONETARY POLICY PREFERENCES OF INDIVIDUAL FOMC MEMBERS: 
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE MEMORANDA OF DISCUSSION 
Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Thomas M. Havrilesky, and Rob Roy McGregor* 
Abstract-The Memoranda of Discussion provide detailed records of 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting deliberations. Proce- 
dures are developed for coding the textual data in the Memoranda and 
assessing the reliability of those codings. The codings are then used in the 
estimation of parameters of individual FOMC members' reaction func- 
tions. Data from the 1970 to 1976 period are employed in the estimation. In 
the future, similar methods could be used to analyze newly released 
transcripts of FOMC meetings held after 1976. 
TN RECENT years empirical analyses of monetary policy 
making have increasingly focused on decisions made by 
individual members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC).1 This focus is motivated by the recognition that 
members' individual decisions underlie the policy choices 
ultimately selected by the committee, and that members 
differ in their innate policy preferences, their political 
loyalties, and their responsiveness to external pressures. 
Most studies of individual FOMC members have examined 
records of votes on the monetary policy directives adopted 
by the committee at each of its meetings. While voting data 
are informative, some differences of opinion among FOMC 
members are not revealed by formal voting records. Once a 
monetary policy directive is put to a vote, there is a tendency 
for members to close ranks, vote approvingly, and present a 
united front to external parties. Given the paucity of dissents 
and the absence of other information that might reveal 
differing preferences, the ability of analysts to distinguish 
differing preferences across individuals or groups of individu- 
als has been limited. 
A possible way to learn more about the policy preferences 
of individual members of the FOMC is by studying the 
textual record of committee deliberations. This "narrative" 
approach has recently gained favor in studies of monetary 
policy making. However, most studies have not focused on 
the policy preferences of individual FOMC members.2 
Data available for such investigations have been limited. 
Until 1976, the FOMC recorded detailed minutes of meet- 
ings and published them after a five-year lag as Memoranda 
of Discussion. The Memoranda contained detailed descrip- 
tions of conversations that took place in meetings and linked 
(paraphrased) statements to specific individuals. In March 
1976 the Fed announced that the Memoranda would be 
discontinued, and publication of detailed records ceased. It 
appeared that no detailed records of FOMC deliberations 
would exist for subsequent meetings. However, in October 
1993 Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan 
revealed in congressional testimony that FOMC meetings 
held since 1976 had been audiotaped, that these tapes had 
been regularly transcribed, and that copies of the transcripts 
were being held within the Fed. The Fed subsequently 
agreed to release edited versions of these transcripts.3 
In this paper we empirically investigate the policy prefer- 
ences of individual FOMC members using data from the 
Memoranda of Discussion for the 1970-1976 period, begin- 
ning with Arthur Burns' appointment as chairman and 
ending with the cessation of the Memoranda.4 While our 
study adds detail to the existing descriptive history of 
monetary policy making in this period, our primary focus is 
on describing methods for reliably coding textual data from 
the Memoranda of Discussion for subsequent use in an 
econometric model of FOMC decision making. The litera- 
ture on content analysis guides us in this effort.5 Since 
institutional arrangements for the making of monetary 
policy have not changed dramatically since the 1970s, these 
methods will have continuing applicability in the future, as 
newly released transcripts are made available. 
In section I we describe the collection of our data and the 
subsequent assessment of their reliability. Section II de- 
scribes our model of FOMC decision making and its 
empirical implementation. Section III presents the empirical 
results, and conclusions follow in section IV. 
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2 Woolley (1984) made use of the FOMC's Memoranda of Discussion to 
provide a narrative of policy making for 1972, and Romer and Romer 
(1989, 1994) have used the Memoranda to help identify periods when the 
Fed intentionally shifted toward disinflationary or expansionary policy 
stances. Boschen and Mills (1995) use the Record of Policy Actions and 
the Memoranda to derive an indicator of monetary policy which they 
compare with indicators derived by other researchers from the same 
sources. The early work of Canterbery (1967) is the only previous study to 
code individuals' preferences on the directive based on comments recorded 
as the Memoranda. None of these studies, however, has incorporated ata 
gleaned from the Memoranda into a model of FOMC decision making. 
3By early 1995, the Fed had published transcripts for only three 
complete years. 
4 This sample period was chosen for several reasons. First, it is the most 
recent period for which the Memoranda re available. Second, the FOMC 
adhered closely to an interest-rate targeting procedure in this period. Our 
model has been developed for such an operating procedure. Third, in these 
years, the discussion of the committee was usually guided by the 
alternative policy scenarios presented by the Fed staff. This facilitates the 
coding of members' preferences. 
5 Discussions of the nature and techniques of content analysis are 
presented by Holsti (1969), Krippendorff (1980), and Weber (1985). 
Applications of content analysis in political science include Padgett (1982) 
and Mosley (1984). 
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I. A Content Analysis of the Memoranda of Discussion 
In each meeting of the FOMC, a monetary policy 
directive is selected by majority vote. Prior to voting on a 
policy directive, members customarily express their indi- 
vidual preferences in the "policy go-around." Discussion 
usually centers on members' views of policy scenarios that 
have been presented by the board's staff. After the discussion 
is completed, the chairman (or a member designated by the 
chairman) proposes a directive to be voted up or down, and 
the formal vote follows. In practice, directives are proposed 
only when majority support is assured. 
Members can then cast either assenting or dissenting 
votes. It is customary to provide an explanation for dissents, 
which can almost always be characterized as "favoring 
ease" or "favoring tightness."6 As we have noted, members 
who ultimately assent often give some indication of dissatis- 
faction with the adopted directive during the course of the 
meeting. In our coding of the Memoranda we will therefore 
distinguish three categories of assents: assents "leaning 
toward ease," assents "leaning toward tightness," and "pure 
assents." In our sample period there were 76 meetings of the 
FOMC, which produced 804 individual votes, excluding 
those of the chairman.7 Our coding task is to classify each of 
those votes into one of the five categories described above 
(dissents for ease or tightness, leans for ease or tightness, 
and pure assents). The remainder of this section describes 
our procedures for coding members' positions and assessing 
coding reliability. 
Five features of our coding procedures are especially 
important for ensuring the quality of the resulting data 
series. First, students employed as coders were required to 
be knowledgeable in the field of monetary economics, but 
were not otherwise connected with the project.8 Second, 
coders were provided with identical written instructions 
describing how positions were to be recognized and coded. 
Third, all voting observations were independently coded by 
at least two individuals. When coding inconsistencies oc- 
curred, a third coder served as a "tie breaker." The tie 
breaker had access to the original source materials as well as 
the explanations for coding decisions provided by the first 
two coders. All coding inconsistencies were also reviewed 
by one of the authors, who provided an alternative coding 
which overruled the first tie breaker in some cases. Fourth, 
the reliability of the codings was assessed using measures of 
consistency commonly employed in content analyses. Fi- 
nally, reliability was further assessed by a sensitivity analy- 
sis of our statistical results. All of our estimations have been 
replicated for four sets of codings: (1) the codings provided 
by the first coder, (2) the codings provided by the second 
coder, (3) the composite coding provided by the first two 
coders with inconsistencies resolved by the student tie 
breaker, and (4) the composite codings with inconsistencies 
resolved by an author. 
Basic source materials for coders were the Memorandum 
of Discussion and the Bluebook prepared by the board staff. 
The Bluebook describes alternative policy scenarios pre- 
sented for the committee to consider in a meeting. For 
example, the staff might present three policy options, labeled 
A, B, and C, progressing from easiest to tightest. For each 
option, forecast ranges for money growth and the Federal 
funds rate are provided. Because members often couch their 
remarks in relation to these options, it is useful to have them 
available when coding. 
The Memorandum of Discussion describes both the 
adopted directive and members' expressed preferences. In 
our coding scheme, leaning positions are defined relative to 
the adopted policy. Members are sometimes explicit about 
their desired funds rate ranges, which can be directly 
compared to the ranges adopted for the directive. When 
explicit information was available, coders were instructed to 
compare the midpoint of a member's desired funds rate 
range to the midpoint of the adopted range, and code leaning 
positions accordingly. For example, if an assenting mem- 
ber's suggested range has a midpoint of 6.0%, but the 
adopted funds rate range midpoint is 6.5%, then a "lean 
favoring ease" should be coded. 
When members do not give explicit bounds for their 
desired funds rates, it is still possible to code leaning 
positions. A member might state a preference somewhere 
between alternatives A and B. If B is adopted and if A is the 
"easier" scenario, then a lean favoring ease should be 
coded. Similarly, a member might argue that the adopted 
policy B is acceptable, but note that errors in the direction of 
ease would be preferable to those in the opposite direction. 
Such statements would also be coded as "leans for ease." 
Detailed instructions given to coders are available from the 
authors upon request. 
To have confidence in our subsequent analyses, we must 
determine whether the codings produced by our procedure 
are reliable. Reliability requires a reasonable degree of 
reproducibility; that is, the results produced from a content 
classification should be robust across multiple codings of the 
raw textual data. Our coding procedure produced two 
complete independent codings (i.e., codings before any 
tie-breaking) which serve as one basis for our assessment of 
reliability. We find agreement in the assigned category on 
78.9% (634 out of 804) of the observations, with a correla- 
tion coefficient of 0.776 between the two codings. 
6 Our original sample included two observations where members dis- 
sented to indicate disapproval of the operating procedure rather than 
dissatisfaction with the adopted policy stance. These observations were 
omitted from our subsequent analysis. 
7 The chairman serves as an agenda setter and consensus builder. Further, 
no chairman has ever cast a dissenting vote. We believe that the voting 
behavior of the chairman is intrinsically different from that of other 
members and have excluded his votes from our analysis. 
8 We employed a total of five students as coders. One coder had 
completed an undergraduate degree with an economics major at Duke 
University, and the other four students were enrolled in master's or Ph.D. 
programs in economics at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte or 
the University of South Carolina. 
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Although percent agreement and the correlation coeffi- 
cient have often been reported in content analyses, neither is 
entirely adequate. Krippendorf (1980) has presented an 
alternative measure of consistency, known as Krippendorf's 
alpha, which has two desirable properties. First, in contrast 
to the percent agreement measure, it adjusts for those chance 
agreements which can occur even if codings are intrinsically 
unrelated. Second, it accounts for the ordinal character of the 
classifications. For our two independent codings, Krippen- 
dorff's alpha for ordinal data is 0.734, which is interpreted to 
mean that observed agreement is 73.4% above chance.9 
While there are no strict cut-off points for assessing an 
acceptable degree of reliability, values in the range of 0.67 to 
0.80 are considered to be in a "gray area." In such cases, an 
assessment of the reliability of the codings hinges upon the 
robustness of results to the use of alternative sets of codings 
in the substantive analysis (Krippendorff (1980, p. 147)). We 
undertake such an assessment in section III. 
While consistency of codings is an important issue, 
correctness of the codings is even more important. Matters 
of judgment clearly accounted for many of the discrepancies 
in our two original codings, but it is also clear that many 
discrepancies resulted from errors in the proper application 
of coding procedures. For example, in coding positions for 
the April 7, 1970, FOMC meeting, one coder incorrectly 
recorded the range for the Federal funds rate adopted by the 
committee. Since all individuals are coded relative to the 
adopted directive, such an error can affect the coding for 
each member present. In this particular case, nine coding 
discrepancies resulted from a single, easily identified error. 
An important function of our tie breaker is to detect and 
correct coding errors that have resulted in discrepancies. 
Because our coders were instructed to explain their 
decisions, it is usually possible to distinguish errors from 
differing judgments. To help in the assessment of data 
reliability the author-coder categorized all discrepancies 
either as "coding errors" or as "coding ambiguities." 
Coding errors occur when an inconsistency results from 
factual errors or misapplications of coding procedures. 
Coding ambiguities occur when the original source materi- 
als are vague, contradictory, or inconclusive regarding an 
individual's position, or when coding instructions fail to 
cover special circumstances in a meeting. The author-coder 
classified 173 mismatching observations, finding a total of 
122 errors and 51 ambiguities.10 Of these 173 discrepancies, 
135 were resolved satisfactorily by the tie breaker, and 38 
were reversed by the author-coder. Thus while the number of 
discrepancies was disappointing, many of them resulted 
from minor correctable errors. We believe that our final 
coding corrects most such errors, and that relatively few 
positions are inherently difficult to code. In our final coding 
of members (i.e., with tie breaks resolved by the author- 
coder), 17 observations (2.1%) are coded as dissents for 
ease, 194 (24.1%) are coded as leans toward ease, 346 
(43.0%) are coded as pure assents, 217 (27.0%) are coded as 
leans toward tightness, and 30 (3.8%) are coded as dissents 
for tightness. 
II. A Model of FOMC Decision Making 
This section summarizes our empirical model of FOMC 
decision making and methods for estimating its parameters. 
The model specifies policy preferences of individual FOMC 
members in the form of desired interest rate reaction 
functions and provides links between those preferences and 
ultimate policy outcomes.11 A key feature of the model is 
that parameters of individual FOMC members' monetary 
policy reaction functions are estimable, even though mem- 
bers' desired policy settings are unobserved. 
The description of the model provided here is skeletal; 
extensive discussions of similar models and methods can be 
found in Chappell et al. (1993, 1995). In addition, a 
complete description of the model and estimation methods 
can be obtained in a working paper available from the 
authors upon request. 
A. Individuals'Reaction Functions 
We begin with equation (1), which specifies desired 
interest rate reaction functions for N members of the FOMC: 
K J 
t= + O 0tkDkit + a jXjt + eit, (1) 
k=1 j=l 
i= 1, . .. , N; t = 1, ... ., T. 
The dependent variable r*t is member i's desired Federal 
funds rate for the intermeeting period following meeting t. 
Members' desired funds rates are not directly observable.'2 
The reaction functions include two sets of independent 
variables, Xjt, j = 1, ... , J, and Dkit, k = 1, ... , K. Included 
among the Xjt are macroeconomic indicators of concern to 
the Fed, for example, forecasts of inflation or unemploy- 
ment. These variables are assumed to vary over time but not 
across members. The variables included among the Dkit vary 
across both members and time. In the present analysis, these 
are dummy variables indicating specific individuals serving 
9 If codings were assigned completely at random, one would expect a 
value of 0 for Krippendorff's alpha. In the case of complete agreement, 
Krippendorff's alpha would equal 1.0. The values of Krippendorff's alpha 
reported in the text were computed using a SAS macro provided in Kang et 
al. (1993). 
10 There were 170 discrepancies between coders 1 and 2. In three other 
cases the author overruled coders 1 and 2 when they were in agreement. 
The author reviewed agreeing coders only when another discrepancy 
revealed an error with the potential to affect all codings in a meeting. 
" Monetary policy reaction functions empirically link a policy instru- 
ment, e.g., the Federal funds rate, to prevailing macroeconomic onditions. 
A reaction function conveniently describes the implicit policy rule 
followed by the central bank. Khoury (1990) provides a recent review of 
the reaction function literature. 
12 Although the Memoranda sometimes indicate individual members' 
desired ranges for the Federal funds rate, this is not routinely the case. 
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on the FOMC.13 The inclusion of these dummy variables 
permits each committee member to have a different reaction 
function intercept.'4 In addition, error terms for the reaction 
functions (1) are assumed to be independently normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance c2. 
B. FOMC Decision Making 
In order to estimate the parameters of equation (1) with 
the available data, some additional assumptions about the 
policy-making process are required. These assumptions are 
described below. 
1. The policy directives adopted by the FOMC effectively 
set a target value for the Federal funds rate. During 
the 1970s the FOMC adopted targets for both money 
growth and the funds rate. However, because the range 
of permitted funds rates was usually narrow, the 
operating procedure is best viewed as funds rate 
targeting.15 
2. The adoptedfunds rate depends on the desired rates of 
committee members. We specify that the funds rate r, 
adopted by the committee is a weighted average of the 
chairman's desired rate and the mean of the desired 
rates of all other members. The chairman's voting 
weight y is an estimable parameter of the model. 
3. The funds rate adopted by the committee is observed 
as the average rate prevailing in the postmeeting 
period. This assumption provides a needed link be- 
tween individuals' desired policies, which are not 
observed, and the postmeeting funds rate, which is 
observed. 
4. Conflicts resulting in eitherformal dissents or internal 
expressions of disagreement within FOMC meetings 
are generated by differences in underlying policy 
preferences. We model the behavior of individual 
members by assuming that differences between an 
individual's desired funds rate and the funds rate 
adopted by the committee trigger both dissents and 
leaning positions. Specifically, if a member prefers a 
funds rate lower than that adopted by the committee, 
and if the difference in rates is sufficiently large (i.e., 
greater than K1), the member will "lean" toward ease. 
If the difference is even larger (i.e., greater than K2), 
the member will dissent favoring ease. Similarly, 
dissents or leans toward tightness are generated when 
an individual prefers a higher funds rate than that 
specified in the proposed directive. The threshold 
parameters K1 and K2 are also estimable. 
C. Empirical Specification 
In our empirical model the variables Dkit in the reaction 
function (1) are dummy variables for 30 individual members 
of the FOMC (excluding the chairman) who voted five or 
more times on the monetary policy directive during the 
1970-1976 period.16 The remaining members accounted for 
a total of just six votes and are collectively represented in the 
intercept ot0. 
Economic target variables included among the Xft in the 
reaction functions are identical to those used in Chappell et 
al. (1993, 1995) and are typical of other reaction function 
studies. We include the lagged Federal funds rate rt-1, 
calculated as the average Federal funds rate between meet- 
ings t- 1 and t, to account for inertia in the movement of 
interest rates. Lagged money growth Mht1, calculated as the 
growth rate of Mi over the two months preceding the 
meeting, is also included. The remaining economic variables 
are three-month-ahead forecasts of the percentage rate of 
change in the consumer price index Pt, the unemployment 
rate Ut, and the growth rate of industrial production IPt. 17 
Although our general model treats the chairman's voting 
weight y as an estimable parameter, in practice we have 
found that its estimates are often imprecise and implausible 
in magnitude.18 In our subsequent empirical work we have 
therefore estimated the model while imposing alternative 
plausible values (0.25, 0.50, 0.75) for y.19 
III. Results 
Table 1 presents estimates of the key model parameters. 
The coefficients of economic variables in the reaction 
functions were obtained from ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
estimation of a reduced-form equation derived from our 
model to explain the postmeeting Federal funds rate. With 
the exception of the inflation rate, signs of the coefficients of 
economic variables in the reaction function are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the Fed "leans against the wind" in 
setting its policy instrument. However, only the lagged funds 
13 Over an extended sample period, many specific individuals will 
occupy the N positions on the committee (when there are no vacancies or 
absences, N = 11). In our notational scheme, member i refers to the 
arbitrarily assigned position number of a member, i.e., i E II, . . , NJ. 
Member i need not be the same specific individual over time. 
14 The model could be generalized to permit other reaction function 
parameters to vary across members. However, it is doubtful that such 
distinctions can be assessed reliably with the limited data available. 
15 See Goodfriend (1991) for a supporting view. 
16 The choice of five votes as the criterion for including a dummy 
variable for a specific individual is somewhat arbitrary. However, it is 
difficult to obtain reliable estimates for individuals who do not vote often. 
The criterion of at least five votes seems to offer a reasonably inclusive and 
tractable solution. 
17 The forecasts are predicted values from "rolling" regression equa- 
tions, explaining each of the target variables. For details, see Chappell et al. 
(1993). 
18 Our data provide evidence on y which is, at best, indirect. The weight 
of the chairman is inferred from evidence on how responsive a given 
member is to variations in the composition of the remainder of the 
committee. For example, if members are very responsive to variations in 
the composition of the committee, it is inferred that the other members 
have a large impact on the adopted directive, and that the impact of the 
chairman must then be relatively small. In the absence of more direct 
evidence, it is not surprising that y is not satisfactorily estimated. 
19 In Chappell et al. (1993) y was estimated to be about 0.21. Alternative 
estimates were obtained by Havrilesky and Gildea (1994), who surveyed 
monetary policy scholars to solicit their subjective estimates of y. 
Respondents typically reported y values in the 0.6 to 0.8 range. When 
specifically asked for a y value for Burns, the mean response was 0.73. We 
are not aware of any other quantitative assessments of the chairman's 
power. 
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TABLE 1.-MONETARY POLICY REACTION FUNCTIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL INTERCEPTS: ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
-y (constrained) 0.2500 0.5000 0.7500 
rt, I 0.7337 0.0886 
0.0143 0.0131 
IP 0.0191 0.0204 
U -0.9321 0.2083 
p -0.0703 0.0564 
oto 7.4019 7.4207 7.4587 
BUCHER -1.1811 0.4271 -0.9166 0.2687 -0.7610 0.1897 
MAISEL -1.1904 0.4334 -0.8718 0.2711 -0.7083 0.1912 
SHEEHAN -0.9407 0.4219 -0.7378 0.2635 -0.6164 0.1849 
MORRIS -0.7626 0.4695 -0.6071 0.2979 -0.5152 0.2115 
MITCHELL -0.5147 0.3952 -0.4474 0.2461 -0.4011 0.1727 
EASTBURN -0.4716 0.4838 -0.4116 0.3137 -0.3656 0.2273 
HOLLAND -0.3672 0.4244 -0.3897 0.2697 -0.3811 0.1931 
BALLES -0.4122 0.4870 -0.3843 0.3114 -0.3499 0.2239 
MAYO -0.3137 0.4173 -0.3100 0.2634 -0.2946 0.1871 
BLACK -0.1923 0.4526 -0.2774 0.2844 -0.3039 0.2000 
DAANE -0.2481 0.4034 -0.2349 0.2508 -0.2236 0.1756 
SHERRILL -0.2024 0.4518 -0.2166 0.2832 -0.2308 0.1998 
COLDWELL -0.1414 0.4545 -0.1975 0.2906 -0.2102 0.2081 
SWAN 0.0130 0.5022 -0.0777 0.3191 -0.1304 0.2273 
BAUGHMAN 0.1125 0.4307 -0.0643 0.2723 -0.1320 0.1941 
WINN 0.0817 0.4131 -0.0433 0.2597 -0.0941 0.1840 
ROBERTSON 0.0445 0.4268 -0.0279 0.2669 -0.0642 0.1879 
JACKSON 0.2231 0.4754 0.0483 0.3136 -0.0267 0.2320 
WALLICH 0.3086 0.4589 0.0669 0.2953 -0.0388 0.2134 
HICKMAN 0.2854 0.5391 0.0897 0.3461 -0.0187 0.2481 
TREIBER 0.3132 0.5901 0.1367 0.3861 0.0471 0.2857 
BRIMMER 0.3215 0.4179 0.1490 0.2593 0.0638 0.1807 
HEFLIN 0.4153 0.4541 0.2079 0.2823 0.0900 0.1984 
MACLAURY 0.4568 0.4228 0.2181 0.2679 0.1098 0.1911 
CLAY 0.5563 0.4551 0.2824 0.2891 0.1488 0.2064 
VOLCKER 0.7928 0.5285 0.4471 0.3489 0.2839 0.2579 
DEBS 1.0937 0.5489 0.5165 0.3360 0.2466 0.2335 
KIMBREL 0.9398 0.4412 0.5303 0.2795 0.3265 0.1995 
FRANCIS 1.1290 0.5357 0.6766 0.3460 0.4464 0.2489 
HAYES 1.2366 0.4111 0.7554 0.2566 0.5140 0.1802 
XI 0.7242 0.0331 0.4919 0.0225 0.3714 0.0170 
X2 2.4259 0.0796 1.6479 0.0540 1.2446 0.0406 
Correlations of coefficients of individual-specific dummy variables 
-y = 0.25 -y = 0.50 -y = 0.75 
y = 0.25 1.0000 0.9972 0.9913 
y = 0.50 1.0000 0.9983 
y = 0.75 1.0000 
rate and the unemployment rate are significantly different 
from zero at the 0.05 level. 
The parameters describing differences across individuals 
have been obtained from the estimation of a reduced-form 
five-category ordered probit model, again derived from our 
behavioral model, explaining members' coded policy posi- 
tions. All of the estimates presented in table 1 employ our 
final set of codings in which decisions regarding discrepan- 
cies were reviewed by an author-coder. The results provide 
evidence of considerable diversity across members, despite 
the infrequency of formal dissents. We initially focus on the 
estimation in which the chairman's weight y is set equal to 
0.50. In table 1, members are listed by intercepts in 
ascending order (i.e., from easy to tight) in the center 
column, corresponding to y = 0.50. Extremes are repre- 
sented by Governor Jeffrey Bucher and New York Federal 
Reserve Bank president Alfred Hayes. Other things held 
equal, desired funds rates for Hayes and Bucher differ by 
1.67 percentage points, with Bucher preferring the easier 
stance. Statistically significant differences between mem- 
bers can be detected in many cases. For example, Wald tests 
(not reported) reveal that Bucher's intercept is significantly 
lower (at the 0.01 level or better) than those of 24 other 
members. Governor J. L. Robertson, whose intercept ranks 
him near the median for the group, has an intercept 
significantly higher than five others and significantly lower 
than three others. 
When alternative values are imposed for y, the chairman's 
voting weight, results are similar in most respects. However, 
the variance of the reduced-form probit model error term 
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TABLE 2.-SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OBTAINED 
FROM ALTERNATIVE CODINGS 
Variable Coder 1 Coder 2 Tie Broken Overruled 
-y (constrained) 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 
OLO 7.3331 7.4380 7.4232 7.4207 
BUCHER -0.6326 -0.9198 -0.9478 -0.9165 
MAISEL -0.7265 -0.7837 -0.9267 -0.8718 
SHEEHAN -0.5887 -0.7006 -0.7427 -0.7378 
MORRIS -0.4096 -0.5705 -0.5792 -0.6071 
MITCHELL -0.2589 -0.3021 -0.3771 -0.4474 
EASTBURN -0.2604 -0.4474 -0.5020 -0.4116 
HOLLAND -0.0595 -0.3554 -0.3876 -0.3897 
BALLES -0.1616 -0.3234 -0.3834 -0.3843 
MAYO -0.2247 -0.2494 -0.4169 -0.3100 
BLACK -0.0478 -0.2790 -0.2879 -0.2774 
DAANE 0.0541 -0.2384 -0.2909 -0.2349 
SHERRILL -0.0326 -0.2860 -0.2410 -0.2166 
COLDWELL -0.0894 -0.1933 -0.2014 -0.1975 
SWAN 0.1169 -0.0755 -0.0916 -0.0777 
BAUGHMAN 0.0994 -0.1310 -0.0526 -0.0643 
WINN 0.2178 -0.0507 -0.0582 -0.0433 
ROBERTSON 0.1452 -0.1566 -0.0195 -0.0279 
JACKSON 0.1969 0.1944 0.1868 0.0483 
WALLICH 0.2655 0.0731 0.0663 0.0669 
HICKMAN 0.2669 -0.0261 -0.0378 0.0897 
TREIBER 0.1355 0.1170 0.3009 0.1367 
BRIMMER 0.2630 0.1311 0.1511 0.1490 
HEFLIN 0.2168 0.2102 0.1923 0.2079 
MACLAURY 0.3210 0.2193 0.1269 0.2181 
CLAY 0.4434 0.3229 0.2677 0.2824 
VOLCKER 0.3308 0.0938 0.3467 0.4471 
DEBS 0.7065 0.4919 0.5157 0.5165 
KIMBREL 0.5639 0.5262 0.5537 0.5303 
FRANCIS 0.9187 0.7088 0.6763 0.6766 
HAYES 0.8677 0.7256 0.7633 0.7554 
XI 0.4985 0.4865 0.4871 0.4919 
X 2 1.6234 1.6338 1.6558 1.6479 
Correlations of coefficients of individual-specific dummy variables 
Coder 1 Coder 2 Tie Broken Overruled 
Coder 1 1.0000 0.9715 0.9687 0.9773 
Coder 2 1.0000 0.9829 0.9787 
Tie broken 1.0000 0.9900 
Overruled 1.0000 
depends on -y, and this affects the scaling of other param- 
eters. For example, as y varies from 0.25 to 0.75, the dissent 
threshold parameter X2 varies from 2.40 to 1.24. Neverthe- 
less, inferences about members' relative preferences for ease 
versus tightness are quite robust. Pairwise correlations for 
the three sets of coefficients in table 1 are all above 0.99. 
We now return to the issue of reliability of our qualitative 
data. A key attribute of coding reliability is that independent 
codings should produce similar substantive conclusions. 
Table 2 addresses this concern. In this table we report 
estimates based on four sets of codings: (1) coder 1, (2) 
coder 2, (3) coders 1 and 2 with discrepancies resolved by 
the tie breaker, and (4) coders 1, 2, and the tie breaker, with 
overrules provided by an author-coder. In each case y has 
been set equal to 0.50. Results across the four columns are 
remarkably similar. Pairwise correlations of the coefficients 
on individual-specific dummy variables are above 0.96 in all 
cases, and rankings of members are nearly identical. Thus 
despite a number of discrepancies across coders, including 
many correctable rrors, our findings appear to be robust. 
From a methodological perspective we are also interested 
in how the availability of data on "leaning" positions 
improves our ability to accurately characterize members' 
preferences. To make such an assessment, we recoded all 
leaning positions as pure assents, thus discarding the infor- 
mation obtained from the Memoranda. We then employed a 
three-category ordered probit model to estimate the param- 
eters of the original model (excepting K1, the threshold for 
leans). Results (not reported) showed that coefficient stan- 
dard errors are typically inflated by about 50% in the results 
based on the three-category probit model. Tests of differ- 
ences between members also revealed fewer significant 
differences. For example, Bucher differed significantly from 
only 21 other members (at the 0.01 level), whereas Robert- 
son differed significantly from just four. Evidently, data from 
the Memoranda do permit more refined distinctions to be 
made across members. 
Members' intercept rankings were generally similar in the 
three-category and five-category estimations. The correla- 
tion coefficient for the two sets of estimates was 0.86, 
indicating considerable consistency between voting behav- 
ior and coded leans, yet not so much consistency that the 
data on leans could be considered redundant. For example, 
estimates from the three-category probit model suggested 
that Henry Wallich was one of the more ease-oriented 
FOMC members (his only dissent in 25 votes was in favor of 
ease), whereas estimates making use of the five-category 
classification suggested the reverse (he leaned for tightness 
12 times and for ease only five times). In the years following 
1976, Wallich consistently favored tighter policies than most 
of his colleagues, a behavioral pattern which is predictable 
based on our estimates using data from the Memoranda, but 
not predictable from his prior voting record. 
IV. Conclusions 
Dissent voting data have previously been employed to test 
a variety of propositions about the behavior of different 
groups of FOMC members. In this paper we have introduced 
a new set of data on individuals' monetary policy prefer- 
ences that have been extracted from the FOMC's Memo- 
randa of Discussion. We find that use of the new data 
permits notably greater precision in estimating parameters 
of individual FOMC members' reaction functions. We also 
find that independent codings of the members' leaning 
positions revealed in the Memoranda of Discussion are able 
to capture aspects of individuals' policy preferences which 
are not evident in voting data alone. Specifically, estimates 
of members' reaction function parameters are robust across 
data produced by independent codings of the Memoranda, 
but in some cases, the estimates are notably different from 
those obtained when only voting data are used. 
In early 1995 the FOMC voted to continue providing 
edited transcripts of its meetings to the public (after a 
five-year waiting period), assuring researchers of an ongoing 
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source of data describing policy preferences of individual 
committee members. Our analysis shows that a careful 
coding of these records should be valuable in future 
investigations of FOMC decision making. 
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